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INVESTIGATORY POWERS
OF CITY COUNCILS
ALICE L. EBEL*

The investigating activities and powers of Congress have in recent
years occupied the limelight in the newspapers, on the radio and television, and in the journals. I The investigating activities of state legislatures and of city councils have received less attention. As a part of the
legislative process at the state and local levels, the investigatory power
is also needed-and used.
Regardless of the level of government-national, state, or localcertain problems arise in the use of the power of investigation by the
legislative branch, and certain abuses may develop. Whatever the level
of government, the power of investigation may be used to further the
legislative process and to attain needed, desirable, and workable legislation; or it may be used for personal or political purposes. It may be
used to further the political ambitions of some or all members of the
investigating committee; or it may be used to embarrass a particular
administration in the belief it will further the fortunes of one political
party.
What are the questions which have arisen in the use of the investigatory power by city councils, and how have they been answered by
the courts? The first problem that has arisen is the scope and extent
of the investigating power of city councils. Is such a power inherent
or must it be specifically granted by the state, either by statutory or
constitutional provision? If a specific grant is needed, does a constitutional grant of home rule include the power of council investigation? Whether the power is inherent or must be based on an express
grant, what are the limitations as to scope? The courts are not in
agreement on the answers to these questions.
*Assistant Professor of Social Sciences, Illinois State Normal University,
Normal, Illinois.

"For

the investigating power of Congress and the problems arising from the
use of such power, see e.g., Forrester, History and Function of Congressional

Investigations, 8 Apu.

L. Rav. 352(1954); Lashley, Investigating Power of

Congress: Its Scope and Limitations, 40 A.B.A. J. 763, 808 (1954); Becker
et al., Symposium on CongressionalHearings and Investigations, 14 FED. B. J.
5 (1954) ; Huard, Fifth Amendment-An Evaluation,42 GEo. L. J. 345 (1954) ;
Levi et al., CongressionalInvestigations, a Symposium, 18 U. oF Cm. L. Rav.
421 (1951); Boudin, Congressional and Agency Investigations-Their Uses

and Abuses, 35 VA. L. Rav. 143 (1949).
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Those courts taking a liberal position in respect to the investigatory
powers of city councils hold, as did the New York Common Pleas
Court in 1855, that "the right to pass laws, necessarily implies the
right to obtain information upon any matter which may become the
subject of law. ' 2 This position has been taken by the courts of several
other states.3 The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that a municipal council has inherent authority to investigate the activities of its
several departments and employees. 4 And the Court of Appeals of
Ohio has gone so far as to say that:
"the city council has an inherent power to make full and complete investigation on any matter coming within their operative
function, whether in contemplation of future legislation or not." 5
In other cases the courts have taken a more strict view of the right
of a city council to investigate and have held that the power must be
expressly conferred by statute. This was the position taken by the
Supreme Court of Albany County, New York, in a 1920 decision
when it held, "The common council of a city has none of the inherent
powers of the Legislature * ** except as such powers may be express'6
ly granted.
Since the investigatory power of a city council has been conferred
by statute in several states, the question as to whether the power is
inherent and exists independently of statute has not arisen. In some
cases where the power has been granted by statute, the courts have,
however, stated that the power was inherent and would exist even if
7
not expressly conferred.
Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30 at 56 (N.Y. 1855). The court referred to
the principle of Parliamentary Law, that either house of a legislative body
may institute an investigation upon "any matter affecting the public interest
upon which it may be important that it should have exact information and in
respect to which it would be competent for it to legislate," and pointed out that
this rule has been accepted by the legislative bodies of the country.
3 See, e.g., State ex rel. Holloway v. Rhodes, 33 O.L.A. 26, 35 N.E.2d 987
(1940) ; Herlands v. Surpless, 258 App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1st Dept.

2

1939), aff'd without opinion, 282 N.Y. 647, 26 N.E.2d 800 (1939).

4 Leahy v. City of Knoxville, 193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d 772 (1951).

56 State ex -el. Holloway v. Rhodes, note 3 supra at 990.
n re Investigation of Contracts of the City of Albany and Its Officials, 113
Misc. 370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (Sup.Ct. 1920). Both earlier and later decisions in
that state had declared that the right to investigate was inherent in the right to
legislate, Briggs v. Mackellar, 2'Abb. Pr. 30 at 54 (N.Y. 1855), and Herlands v.
Surpless, 258 App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S.2d 454, 457 (1st Dept. 1939), aff'd
without opinion, 282 N.Y. 647, 26 N.E.2d 800 (1939). See also 4 MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §13.05 (3d ed. 1949).
7 Leahy v. City of Knoxville, 193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d 772 at 773 (1951) : "We
think that a municipality has the inherent authority to investigate the activities
of its several departments- and employees. However, in looking to the charter
provisions of the city of Knoxville, we find ample authority for such investigations." Herlands v. Surpless, 258 App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S.2d 454 at 457 (1st
Dept. 1939), aff'd without opinion, 282 N.Y. 647, 26 N.E.2d 800 (1939) : "Aside
from the express right to investigate conferred by statute, the right to pass
laws necessarily implies the right to direct an investigation of any matter which
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In New York City the charter explicitly gives the council authority
to conduct investigations and take testimony of witnesses under oath."
The number of cases in recent years involving investigations made
under this grant is indicative of the use which is made of the power.9
Cases have arisen under similar charter authorizations in St. Louis ;1o
Toledo"I and Columbus, 2 Ohio; Yonkers, 3 Niagara Falls, 4 and Kingston,"5 New York; Knoxville, Tennessee ;"6 and Virginia, Minnesota.YI
In some states the legislature has by general act empowered city
councils to carry out investigations. An appellate court of New York,
in the case of Frank v. Balog, held,
"The provision in General City Law for conduct of inquiry into
city affairs, attendance of witnesses, and issuance of subpoena
in furtherance thereof is applicable where express statutory
authority does not otherwise exist for such procedure."' s
In 1920, a statute of the State of New York-the Second Class
Cities Law, section 40was cited by the Supreme Court of Albany
8

may become the subject of law." State ex rel. Holloway v. Rhodes, 33 O.L.A.
26, 35 N.E.2d 987 (1940).
NEW YORc CITY CHARTER, §43 (1943), grants the City Council power to

investigate "any matters relating to the property, affairs, or government of the
city." See also the charters adopted under authority of LAWS (1934), c. 867, by
referendum Nov. 3, 1936, effective Jan. 1, 1938; and LAWS (1897), c. 378, as
revised by LAws (1901), c. 466.
9La Guardia v. Smith, 176 Misc. 482, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942) ; Barry v.
City of New York, 175 Misc. 712, 25 N.Y.S2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Smith v.
Kern, 175 Misc. 937, 26 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd without opinion,
260 App. Div. 1003, 24 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dept 1940), aff'd without opinion, 285
N.Y. 632, 33 N.E2d 556 (1941); In re Radio Station WNYC (Novik), 169
Misc. 502, 7 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd without opinion, 255 App. Div.
844, 7 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1st Dept. 1938), aff'd without opinion, 280 N.Y. 628, 20
N.E.2d 1008 (1939); Herlands v. Surpless, 258 App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S.2d 454
(1st Dept. 1939), aff'd without opinion, 282 N.Y. 647, 26 N.E.2d 800 (1939).
10 Ex parte Holman, 197 Mo. App. 70, 191 S.W. 1109, aff'd, 270 Mo. 696, 195 S.W.
711 (1917) ; Ex parte Conrades, 185 Mo. 411, 85 S.W. 150 (1904) ; In re Dunn,
9 Mo. App. 255 (1880).
"1 Haas v. Jennings. Same v. La Penas. Same v. Murphy, 120 Ohio St. 370, 166
N.E. 357 (1929). The charter provision quoted here is typical: "Section 58.
Investigations by Council. The council, or any committee thereof duly
authorized by the council to do so may investigate the financial transactions of
any office or department of the city government, and the official acts and
conduct of any city official, and by similar investigations may secure information upon any matter within its competence as a legislative body... !'
12 State ex rel. Holloway v. Rhodes, 33 O.L.A. 26, 35 N.E.2d 987 (1940).
"3 Frank v. Balog, 189 Misc. 1016, 73 N.Y.S.2d 285, aff'd, 272 App. Div. 941, 72
N.Y.S.2d 75 (2nd Dept. 1947). This investigation was authorized, according
to the court, not only by the city's Supplemental Charter but also by the
General City Law and Civil Practice Act, §406.
'4 Judson v. City of Niagara Falls, 140 App. Div. 62, 124 N.Y.S. 282 (4th Dept.
1910), aff'd, 204 N.Y. 630, 97 N.E. 1107 (1910).
"5People ex rel. Webster v. Van Tassel, 64 Hun. 444, 17 N.Y.S. 938, aff'd, 19
N.Y.S. 643 (3rd Dept. 1892).
16 Leahy v. City of Knoxville, 193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d 772 (1951).
IT State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915).
The
court did not question the city's right to investigate under its home rule
charter, but refused to sanction its right to punish a witness. See note 104
infra.
IsSee note 13 supra.
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County as vesting the council of the City of Albany with the power

to investigate. 19 As early as 1860 the common council of any city
in the same state had power to investigate, summon witnesses, and
punish for perjury and contempt. 20 Today New York still empowers
any city "to investigate and inquire into all matters of concern to the
city or its inhabitants."" A grant of power to investigate in Illinois
authorizes municipalities of over 500,000 population to examine and
compel attendance of witnesses and production of papers. 2 2 Missouri3

grants investigatory powers to all four classes of cities in that state.
general5 grants of power to
Among the other states which have given
28
24
city councils to investigate are Michigan,'

Ohio,

and Rhode Island.

City councils have scrutinized a variety of matters. Under inquiry
have been police departments,' 7 a civil service commission,', contracts
and improving
made by a city with a coal company,'29 the widening
32
31
30
of a street,' the management of a radio station

and of a hospital,

19 In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials, 113 Misc.
370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1920). §40 of the Second Class Cities Law
stated, "The common council may ... regulate the powers and duties of any
city officer or department and it has power to investigate all city officers and
departments and shall have access to all records and papers kept by every city
officer or department, and has power to compel attendance of witnesses and
the production of books, papers or other evidence at any meeting of the common council or of any committee thereof, and for that purpose may issue
subpoenas signed by the president." Cities of the second class at that time were
cities of from 50,000 to 175,000 population, N.Y. CONsT, art. XII, §2 (1920).
In this case the court held that it was the Second Class Cities Law, supra,
rather than the sections of the General City Law, relating to investigations by
committees of a common council, that conferred on a committee or council
of a city of the second class the authority to investigate municipal affairs.
20 COMP. OF LAWS OF THE STATE OF

N.Y. RELATING

PARTICULARLY TO THE CITY OF

N.Y. (Valentine 1862). 477: "An Act to compel the Attendance of Witnesses
before Committees of Common Councils of Cities and to Punish False Swearing by such Witnesses," passed Feb. 18, 1860. §4 of this act repealed "An act
to enable the common council of the city of New York to take testimony in
matters referred for investigation or inquiry," passed Feb. 8, 1855, and cited
in Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30 at 31, 32, as the authority for a police
department investigation.
21 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW, §20-21 (1951).
This excludes all cities of the state
22 ILL. REv. STAT., c. 24, §23-111 (1953).
except Chicago. DuBois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill.2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295 (1954) holds
this classification valid because "it is founded on a rational difference of situation or condition existing in the persons or objects upon which it rests and
there is a reasonable basis for the classification in view of the objects and
purposes to be accomplished."
"3Mo. REv. STAT. c. 73, §270; c. 75, §170; c. 77, §100; c. 79, §180 (1949).
24 Comp. LAWS, MICH. c. 88, §18, 19 (1948).
25 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §705.21 (1954).
Grants of power to investigate, both
26 GEN. LAWS OF R. I. c. 537, §4 (1938).
general and special, appear to be limited to a comparatively few states.
27 Haas v. Jennings, 120 Ohio St. 370, 166 N.E. 357 (1929) ; Briggs v. Mackellar,
2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y. 1855).
28 Smith v. Kern, 175 Misc. 937, 26 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1940) aff'd without
opinion, 260 App. Div. 1003, 24 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dept. 1940), aff'd without
opinion, 285 N.Y. 632, 33 N.E.2d 556 (1941).
29 In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials, 113 Misc.
370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
30 In re Van Tine a Nims, 12 How. Pr. 507, 3 Abb. Pr. 39 (N.Y. 1855).
31 In re Radio Station WNYC (Novik), 169 Misc. 502, 7 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct.
1938), aff'd without opinion, 255 App. Div. 844, 7 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1st Dept.
1938), affd without opinion, 280 N.Y. 628, 20 N.E.2d 1008 (1939).
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collective action of city employees in lobbying, 33 the administration
of
35
relief funds, 34 and the alliance between crime and politics.

The courts are the final arbiters as to the subjects which may be
investigated. The subject-matter of inherent investigatory power has
generally been conceded to be as broad as, if not broader than, that
upon which cities may legislate. 36 Statutes or charters tend to grant
3T
authority to investigate almost any municipal office or department,
3
action not necessarily within a city council's power to legislate.
Inquiries cannot extend to the private affairs of citizens. 39 Yet courts
have refused to concern themselves with the motives, the reasonableness, and even the subject-matter of an investigating committee of a
40
city council.
In its investigative capacity a city council may act more independently of the executive than in its legislative capacity. A resolution of
the New York City Council setting up an investigating committee was
held, because of its style and language, not to require the approval of
the mayor ;1 nor was the Commissioner of Investigation, an administrative officer of the executive branch of the same city, permitted to
42
inquire into the wisdom of certain council action in an investigation.
Conversely,
"Neither the mayor nor any other city officer is beyond the
scope of investigations which committees appointed by the New
York City Council are authorized by charter to make, unless
some statute or other principle of law secures
to the mayor
'43
immunity from subpoena by such committee.
1n re Lincoln Hospital, Bronx, 174 Misc. 389, 20 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
aff'd 259 App. Div. 883, 20 N.Y.S2d 717 (1st Dept. 1940), rev'd on other
33 grounds, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E. 31 (1940).
Leahy v. City of Knoxville, 193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d 772 (1951).
3 Herlands v. Surpless, 258 App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1st Dept. 1939), aff'd
without opinion, 282 N.Y. 647, 26 N.E.2d 800 (1939).
3
5DuBois v. Gibbons, 2 Ill2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295 (1954).
36 See notes 2 through 5 supra.
32

37See notes 8 and 19 supra.

Without a charter provision, the court said in Smith v. Kern (note 28 supra),
it would question the authorization of a special council committee to investigate the Civil Service Commission for the purpose of laying a foundation
for a petition to the mayor calling for the removal of administrative officials,
since the purpose was not to bring about remedial legislation.
39 In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials, note 39
supra at 526; In re Van Tine a Nims, note 30 supra. Cf. In re Ellis, 176 Misc.
887, 28 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 197
N.E. 220 (1935) ; In re Barnes, 204 N.Y. 108, 97 N.E. 508 (1912).
40 Frank v. Balog, 189 Misc. 1016, 73 N.Y.S.2d 285, aff'd 272 App. Div. 941, 72
N.Y.S.2d 75 (2nd Dept. 1947) ; State v. Rhodes, 33 O.L.A. 26, 35 N.E.2d 987
(1940) ; In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials,
113 Misc. 370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1920). In Frank v. Balog, supra at
286; the Supreme Court of Westchester County held, "Council members conducting investigation of municipal affairs in connection with proposed legislation were proceeding as administrative officers in performance of administrative functions, and court could not review exercise of such function in proceeding to compel attendance of witnesses at investigation, but court must
assume that members were discharging their duties for welfare of entire
4 1 community and to promote best interests of all citizens thereof."
In re Radio Station WNYC, note 31 supra.
42 In re Ellis, 176 Misc. 887, 28 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
43LaGuardia v. Smith, 176 Misc. 482, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942). For a
38
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The court held that the separation of powers does not apply to city
44
governments.
If a city has the authority to investigate, it follows that it should
have authority to appropriate the money needed to make an investigation. The Supreme Court of Tennessee so held in Leahy v. City of
Knoxville.4 5 But taxpayers who sought to restrain the spending of
money for an investigation that they alleged was unnecessary and
futile were upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
because the proposed expenditure could not be justified for public
use.46 That political considerations would be an important factor in
47
determining the amount appropriated, there can be little doubt.
The selection of the group to carry on the investigation may be
subject to similar political considerations.4 8 A committee of the council is the usual body. 49 The size of the committee has seldom been a

matter of adjudication. The highest court of New York has held that
a city council had power to authorize each member of a special investigating committee to act as a subcommittee of one to examine
witnesses.50 City councils have also authorized the mayor 5' or appointed
a special agent 52 to make inquiries for them. When the common
council of Detroit made an investigation through a committee of fifty
citizens chosen by the mayor, the Supreme Court of Michigan held
that it was within the power of the council to "conduct its investigation through a committee of outsiders or through the mayor, providing the investigation is made in its behalf, in accordance with its
directions, and subject to its control, and the results are reported to
it for action.

53

discussion of the relation of the Chicago City Council's Committee on Crime
to the courts, see 20 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 717 at 724, 725. The contention here is
that municipal courts set up by state statute are not within the power of a city
investigating committee.
44 Ibid. See id. at 156 for a number of supporting cases. For a discussion of the
separation of powers as applied to city government, see 42 COL. L. REv. 12171221.
45193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d 772 (1951).
46Whiting v. Mayor of Holyoke, 272 Mass. 116, 172 N.E. 338 (1930). Cf.
Attorney General ex rel. Maguire v. Murphy, 157 Mich. 615, 122 N.W. 260
(1909).
4 20 U. OF CH. L. REv. 717 at 725.
48 Ibid.
49 See, e.g., notes 27 through 34 supra. In It re Radio Station WNYC, note 31
supra at 299, the court stated that the council had power to appoint the members of an investigating committee because the council has authority to appoint

its own committees.

50 Smith v. Kern, note 28 supra. Cf. In re Joint Legislative Committee to In-

vestigate Educational System of State of New York, 285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E.2d 769
(1941); In re Gordon, 141 Misc. 635, 252 N.Y.S. 858 (Sup. Ct. 1931); In re
Leach, 197 App. Div. 702, 189 N.Y.S. 352 (1st Dept. 1921).

51

Note 46 supra.

52 Friedman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948) ; State v. Rhodes,
33 O.L.A. 26, 35 N.E.2d 987 (1940).
53 Attorney-General ex rel. Maguire v. Murphy, 157 Mich. 615, 122 N.W. 260

(1909).
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Besides having considerable freedom in determining the composition of the investigating agency, city councils have been given some
discretion in procedures used in conducting an investigation. In Massachusetts the highest court ruled that the legislative department of a
city could hear evidence voluntarily laid before them, showing misconduct on the part of any officer of the city. 54 A New York City
Charter provision requiring the council to sit with open doors has been
held not to deprive a subcommittee of a special investigating committee
of the council of the power to examine witnesses at private examinations. The court reasoned that the charter provision referred to
legislative sessions only and not to fact-finding investigations, the
purpose of which would be circumvented by public hearings. 55
The power of a municipal legislative body to employ counsel to aid
in its investigations seems to be indisputable. 56 The right to appoint
a committee to investigate, summon witnesses, and to take testimony
under oath impliedly empowers the council to employ legal assistance ;57
or, as an incidence to its general power, a common council has such
authority in order to perform the duties with which it is charged by
law.58 Likewise, the employment of independent counsel other than
the corporation counsel has been upheld out of a "due regard for
properties"59 and to prevent the anomaly of the corporation counsel's
appearing as the legal advisor of two antagonistic departments under
investigation." Appointment of independent counsel would not preclude the corporation counsel, however, from affecting the course of
the investigations as he advised other municipal officers of their
rights.6 1
Once an investigation is under way, it can be effective only to the
extent that information germane to the investigation can be obtained.
Therefore, the power to compel attendance of witnesses and production of papers is vital. The charters and statutes which confer on
the city council the power to investigate generally confer also the
power to issue subpoenas. 6 2 In the few cases which suggest that the
54 Lodge v. Fletcher, 184 Mass. 238, 68 N.E. 204 (1903).
55 Note 28 supra.
56 4 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §13.05 (3d ed.
57
8 Barry v. City of New York, 175 Misc. 712, 25 N.Y.S.2d

1949).
27 (Sup. Ct. 1941).

5SJudson v. City of Niagara Falls, 140 App. Div. 62, 124 N.Y.S. 282 (4th Dept.

1910), aff'd 204 N.Y. 630, 97 N.E. 1107 (1910).
59 Note 57 supra at 32.
60 Note 58 supra at 285. The right of a city council to be independent of the
executive branch in employing counsel of its own selection to give legal
assistance in investigations is also maintained in In re Ellis, 176 Misc. 887, 28
N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1941). The independence of the council is further
guaranteed in this case by the court's prohibiting an investigation by the executive branch of the wisdom of the council's choice of legal advisor.
6120 U. or CHI. L. REv. 717 at 725.
62 See, e.g., Haas v. Jennings, 120 Ohio St. 370, 166 N.E. 357 (1929) ; In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials, 113 Misc. 370, 184
N.Y.S. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Ex parte Holman, 197 Mo. App. 70, 191 S.W.
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right to obtain information essential to investigation and subsequent
legislation is possessed inherently by municipal legislatures, an express
statutory grant also empowers them to compel attendance of witnesses.6 3 In one such case, the action of the council in conducting an
investigation was said to be "equivalent to that of the Legislature and
in construing motions to vacate the subpoenas the courts are construing
a legislative act." 6 4 The usual interpretation, however, holds for the
necessity of a statutory grant. Therefore, we are justified in concluding that
"authority of a common council or one of its committees [to
compel attendance of witnesses] * * * is purely statutory and
lacks inherent power which legislative committees have under
common law."6 5
An express grant of subpoena power usually states who the issuing
authority shall be. As we have seen from the cases under consideration, investigations carried on other than under an express grant are
rare.6 6 For the most part, the power to issue a subpoena is given to a
city council or its committees. This is true in general statutory provisions 67 as well as in special charters. 68 In Illinois, the clerk of the
municipality, by order of the corporate authorities, issues subpoenas. 69
The statutes of Ohio and Rhode Island indicate that the presiding
officer of the municipal legislature shall sign the subpoena. 70 In Michigan the mayor or any justice of the peace of the city is empowered
as the issuing authority. 71 In the New York City case of Herlands
1109, aff'd, 270 Mo. 696, 195 S.W. 711 (1917) ; State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald,
131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915) ; People ex rel. Webster v. Van Tassel,

64 Hun. 444, 7 N.Y.S. 938, af'd, 10 N.Y.S. 643 (3d Dept. 1892); In re Dunn,

9 Mo. App. 255 (1880); Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y. 1855). State
ex reL Peers v. Fitzgerald, supra, and In re Dunn, supra, cite home rule

charters. Typical of the pewer granted is part of art. 4, §40, of the Second
Class Cities Law quoted in In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany
and Its Officials, supra at 523, ". . . and it [common council] has power to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers or other evi-

63

dence at any meeting of the common council or of any committee thereof, and
for that purpose may issue subpoenas signed by the president."
See, e.g., Frank v. Balog, 189 Misc. 1016, 73 N.Y.S.2d 285 aff'd 272 App. Div.
941, 72 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d Dept. 1947); Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y.

1855). In the former case the court points out that the right to subpoena wit-

nesses, besides being implied in the right to investigate, is authorized by the

General City Law, the Supplemental Charter, and the Civil Practice Act. See
also Ex parte Holman, 197 Mo. App. 70, 191 S.W. 1109, aff'd, 270 Mo. 696, 195
S.W.711 (1917).
64 Herlands v. Surpless, 258 App. Div. 275, 16 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1st Dept. 1939),
aff'd without opinion, 282 N.Y. 647, 26 N.E.2d 800 (1939).
65 In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials, 113 Misc.
370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1920) at 524.
66 Notes 2 through 17 supra.

67 Notes 23 through 26 supra.
68 Note 62 supra.

69 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24, §23-111 (1953).
70 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §705.21 (1954).

(1938).

71

CoMp. LAWS, MICH. c. 88, §18 (1948).

GEN. LAWS OF R. I. c. 537, §4
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v. Surpless subpoenas were procured by the committee of the council
from a court, as authorized by the general act; while under the city
charter the council itself had authority to issue them. 72 By the charter
in effect in Toledo in 1929, both mayor and council were authorized
to issue subpoenas. 73 Where the authority to subpoena was vested in
the council, a strict construction held that subpoenas for witnesses
to testify before a committee must be issued by the common council
74
itself, and not by the committee.
Statutes and charters authorizing the summoning of witnesses and
the production of books and papers may or may not indicate who is to
serve the subpoena. When express statement is made, it is generally
to the effect that the subpoena shall be served or executed by "an
officer authorized by law to serve subpoenas and other process." 75
The administration of oaths to witnesses is sometimes also spelled out.
The council and its committees, or the presiding officer, in particular,
may be designated to administer oaths to witnesses.76 With complaints
about alleged bad motives, political or otherwise, in issuing subpoenas,
77
courts have refused to be concerned.
What power a municipal investigating body has over a private
person and his papers has been in question in several cases. A claim
that the subpoena power was limited to employees of the city was
rejected by a court on the basis that charter authorization to investigate
72 Note 64 supra. Cf. Frank v. Balog, 189 Misc. 1016, 73 N.Y.S.2d 285 aff'd 272
App. Div. 941, 72 N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d Dept. 1947) where the court upheld the
authority of a committee of the common council to issue subpoenas under a
supplemental charter provision when a general act provided for their issuance
by application of the chairman of the investigating committee to a court. The
first general act in New York had practically the same provision, note 20 supra.
73 Haas v. Jennings, 120 Ohio St. 370, 166 N.E. 357 (1929). The charter also provided that any person or persons appointed by the mayor and that any committee of the council had the same power.
74 In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials, 113 Misc.
370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (Sup: Ct. 1920). The Illinois statute vesting the subpoena
power in the "corporate authority" might be so construed, ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24,
§23-111 (1953). In Ex parte Holman, 197 Mo. App. 70, 191 S.W. 1109, aff'd
270 Mo. 696, 195 S.W. 711 (1917), the court notes that the power to subpoena
may be specifically delegated, under the charter, to any committee.
7 §58 of Toledo City Charter as cited in Haas v. Jennings, note 73 supra. See
also State v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915) ; Mo. REv. STAT.,
note 23 supra; OHIo REv. CODE ANN., note 25 supra. Unusual detail was included in the New York Act of 1860, §2, note 20 supra: "Such summons shall
be served by showing to the witness the original summons, under the hand
of the officer issuing the same, and delivering to such witness a copy of the
summons, or a ticket containing its substance, and paying him the fees of
witnesses in civil actions in courts of record." The Missouri statute, c. 77, §100
supra, guarantees that city shall pay the process server such fees as are
allowed by law for similar service.
76 See e.g., notes 23, 24, 26 supra.
77
In re Ellis, 176 Misc. 887, 28 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Herlands v. Surpless, note 64 supra; Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 197 N.E. 220 (1935);
In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials, 113 Misc.
370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1920). Relevancy is material, but the subpoena
need not contain a declaration that the books or papers demanded are material
to the investigation, In re Dunn, 9 Mo. App. 255 (1880).
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"municipal affairs" included "conditions affecting every department
and entire population of city, and not merely employees of city, and
hence charter does not restrict use of subpoena to city employees."' 8
In investigations in St. Louis forty years apart, gas company officials
who challenged the right to summon them and the papers of their
private businesses were told by the courts that they could not refuse
to obey subpoena since their testimony and papers were material to
the inquiry. 79
On the other hand, since there was no clear warrant of the law,
a private corporation having a contract with a city was held not required to submit to an examination of its books and papers concerning
its contract with the city.80 And in St. Louis, again, the examination
of the private books and papers of a private business concern in an
investigation of city departments was not permitted, being deemed a
violation of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and
seizure and self-incrimination."1
There is little question about the power of a council investigating
committee to summon city officers and require the production of
official papers in their charge.8 2 In fact, some sort of specification of
the authority over city officials and departments, or implication of
this authority in establishing power over municipal affairs, is found in
most enabling legislation, charter or statutory. 83 The official records
and documents of an organization of municipal employees were considered not subject to personal privilege against self-incrimination
since the employees held them in a "representative rather than a
personal capacity. ' 84 At the same time, a city council was not permitted to require the production of papers by physicians of a city
hospital under a privilege created by statute providing that physicians
should not be allowed to disclose information acquired in attending
7s Frank v. Balog, 189 Misc. 1016, 73 N.Y.S.2d 285, aff'd 272 App. Div. 941, 72
N.Y.S.2d 75 (2d Dept. 1947).
79 "No rule of law exempts any person from producing books or papers material
to an inquiry in the course of justice, merely because they are private," In re
Dunn, 9 Mo. App. 255 (1880). Ex parte Holman, 197 Mo. App. 70, 191 S.W.
1109, aff'd, 270 Mo. 696, 195 S.W. 711 (1917). Ibid. at 1110 points out also that
the president of a public service corporation cannot justify his refusal to testify
on the grounds that "if he could be called every citizen engaged in a purely
private business might be subjected to like proceedings; petitioner not being
engaged in a private business."
80 In re Investigation of Contracts of City of Albany and Its Officials, 113 Misc.
370, 184 N.Y.S. 518 (Sup. Ct. 1920). At 526 the court further explains that the
council is vested with power to summon city officers and their papers only.
81 Ex parte Conrades, 185 Mo. 411, 85 S.W. 150 (1904). Cf. In re Ellis, 176 Misc.
887, 28 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; In re Barnes, 204 N.Y. 108, 97 N.E. 508
(1912).
82 Note 80 supra.
83 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. c. 24, §23-111 (1953) ; N.Y. CITY CHARTER §21 (1936)
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §20-21 (1951).
84 Leahy v. City of Knoxville, 193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d 772 (1951).
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a patient in a professional capacity.85 When the mayor of New York
City, in the course of a council investigation of the Civil Service Commission, received a subpoena duces tecum, he moved to vacate the
subpoena on the ground that his immunity should be implied from the
doctrine of separation of powers. The Court of Appeals, however,
held that this doctrine does not generally apply to city governments
and that the council had the right to subpoena documents from the
office of mayor concededly pertinent to an official investigation. 6
Whether the questions asked of a witness or the books and papers
required of him are material to the investigation may be one of the
chief safeguards of witnesses. An early New York act specified that
a court should issue a summons to a witness if it "satisfactorily"
appeared that the testimony of the witness "is or may be material in
such investigation or inquiry."8 But a witness must presume that an
investigating committee will confine itself to matters within its jurisdiction and may not refuse to testify on the grounds that the committee might act arbitrarily or capriciously."" Even though the inquiry
was relevant, the Court of Appeals of New York held that a statute
protecting professional information acquired by a physician permitted
him to refuse to testify. 9 Witnesses were also permitted to refuse
to answer questions about their observations of illegal activities, the
price paid for stocks, or any of their private activities not pertinent
to the investigation."0 Questions, however, as to a policeman's income
and his ability to save money were held to have a direct bearing on
a municipal investigation of the alliance between crime and politics. 9'
The position taken by the courts in respect to the relevancy of
testimony applies also to subpoenas duces tecun. Witnesses are pro8

5 New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940). This
case reverses In re Lincoln Hospital, Bronx, N.Y.
note 32
Cf.467
Egan
v. Board
(1912).
98 N.E.
147,supra.
of Water Supply of City of New York, 205
s LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942). The motion was denied
in the Supreme Court, 176 Misc. 482, 27 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1941) and affirmed in
the Appellate Division, 262 App. Div. 708, 27 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dept. 1941),
motion for leave to appeal denied 262 App. Div. 726, 28 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1st
Dept. 1941). Petitioner appealed by permission of the Court of Appeals, the
highest state court. A discussion of this case in relation to the doctrine of
separation of powers is found in 42 COL. L. REv. 1217-1221. Cf. In re joint
Legislative Committee to Investigate Educational System of State of New
York, 285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E2d 769 (1941) in which the Court of Appeals was
87 reluctant to quash a subpoena in advance of a hearing.
CoNp. OF LAWS OF THE STATE OF N.Y. RELATING PARTICULARLY TO THE CITY OF
N.Y. (Valentine, 1862). 478, §2.
8
8 Ex parte Holm, 197 Mo. App. 70, 191 S.W. 1109, aff'd 270 Mo. 696, 195 S.W.
8 711 (1917).
9Note 85 supra. Cf. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 284 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E.

487 (1928).

90 In re Barnes, 204 N.Y. 108, 97 N.E. 508 (1912) ; In re Cole, 16 Misc. 134, 38
N.Y.S. 955 (Co. Ct. 1896) ; In re Van Tine a. Nims, 12 How. Pr. 507, 3 Abb.
Pr. 39 (N.Y. 1855); Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y. 1855). Cf.
Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 197 N.E. 220 (1935).
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tected by the courts when the papers and books summoned are not
material to the investigation. 92 That the person affected might be
entitled to test the propriety of a subpoena duces tecum by application in advance of production of papers is suggested in one case 93 and
denied in another,9" neither case dealing with a city council investigation. There is similar disagreement over the protection afforded
witnesses by constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search or
9 5

seizure.

An important privilege of witnesses generally applicable to legislative investigations is the privilege against self-incrimination. Iowa
and New Jersey are the only two states which do not have a constitutional provision on self-incrimination,9" and in them such a privilege
is a part of the common law. 9 7 The privilege, as applying to city council
investigations, was asserted in two early New York cases. In one case
there was a qualification: "A witness is not bound to answer any
questions where his answer would tend to criminate or degrade him,
unless the question is essential to the direct proof of the matter under
investigation." 98 In the other case it was stated that "the witness himself must be the judge, how far the answer may tend to criminate
him." But the witness could have been compelled to state the grounds
upon which he refused to answer.9 9 This contrasts with a Tennessee
Supreme Court decision in 1951 where the "examining tribunal" was
held to be the one to decide the matter in respect to subpoenaed
records.'
When it has been a point at issue, the privilege of witnesses
against self-incrimination seems to have been respected. 0 1
Exceptions to this consideration for a witness' privilege against
self-incrimination may be found when public officers and employees
91 DuBois v. Gibbons, 2 IU1.2d 392, 118 N.E.2d 295 (1954).
State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915). Cf.
Hirshfield v. Craig, 239 N.Y. 98, 145 N.E. 816 (1924), where the Court of
Appeals ruled that samples of granite are not "books and papers."
93
1n re Ellis, 176 Misc. 887, 28 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
94In
re Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Educational System of State
of New York, 285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E.2d 769 (1941).
95 Herlands v. Surpless, note 64 supra; In re Conrades, 185 Mo. 411, 85 S.W. 160
(1904) ; In re Dunn, 9 Mo. App. 255 (1880).
9020 U. OF Cm. L. Rav. 717 at 723, n. 39.
97 State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935, 937, 938 (1902) ; State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 Atl. 743, 744 (1903).
98
Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y. 1855). Rules of Parliamentary Law
governing the examination of witnesses are listed here.
99 In re Van Tine a. Nims, 12 How. Pr. 507, 509, 3 Abb. Pr. 39, 41 (N.Y. 1855).
Apparently, the reasons for refusing to answer were so obvious that the
special committee did not ask the witness to state them.
100 Leahy v. City of Knoxville, 193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d 772, 775 (1951).
101 A city council would be in no position to grant immunity against state prosecution, 20 U. OF CHI. L. Ray. 717 at 726. An Ohio statute provides that, while
a witness must testify, "such testimony shall not be used against him in any
criminal prosecution, except for perjury," OHIO REv. CODE ANN., tit. 7, §705.21
92

(1954).
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are being examined. Courts have upheld the dismissal of police officers invoking the privilege, on the ground that refusal to testify
is repugnant to the position of trust which they have taken upon themselves. 10 2 The cases in point have arisen in regard to grand jury investigations, but it seems as if similar reasoning would apply to legislative investigations on the municipal level. In Louisiana any city officer
or employee refusing to waive immunity from prosecution when
questioned by an officer or body authorized to conduct any inquiry
10 3
forfeits his position in the classified service of the city.
The effectiveness of an investigatory committee is also dependent
on its ability to take action against recalcitrant witnesses. In both
home rule and non-home rule states, courts have held that "such
power [to punish for contempt] is not to be inferred, but must be
clearly granted either by the Constitution or by statute."' 0' In some
cases there has been a charter grant of power to punish for con07
and Rhode Island 0 8
tempt. 10 5 The statutes in Illinois,", Ohio,
which authorize municipal legislative investigations also prescribe punishment for witnesses held in contempt. 09 When the nature of punish102 Moretti v. Civil Service Board of Chicago Park District (Circuit Court of
Cook County, 1952) reported in 34 Cmi. BA RREc. 77 (1952) ; Drury v. Hurley,
339 Ill. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949) ; Christal v. Police Commission of City
and County of San Francisco, 33 Calif. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939);
DeGuire v. Police Commission of City and County of San Francisco, 33 Calif.
App.2d 576, 92 P.2d 423 (1939); Roche v. Police Commission of City and
County of San Francisco, 33 Calif. App.2d 574, 92 P.2d 422 (1939) ; Souder v.
City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 Atl. 245 (1931). Cf. McAuliffe v. Mayor
of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) : "The petitioners
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman."
103 LA. REv. STAT., tit. 33, c. 5, §2427 (1950). Under a similar New York City
Charter provision a high school teacher was dismissed, Goldway v. Board of
Higher Education, 178 Misc. 1023, 37 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct 1942). Cf. N.Y.
CONST., art. I, §6 (1954) and ILL. REv. STAT., c. 38, §82 (1953) in reference to
grand jury investigations.
104 Ex parte Holman, 197 Mo. App. 70, 191 S.W. 1109, aff'd 270 Mo. 696, 195 S.W.
711 (1917); State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750
(1915); Ex parte Conrades, 185 Mo. 411, 85 S.W. 150 (1904). Cf. In re
Llewellyn, 2 Pa. Dist. Rep. 631 (1893); Brown v. Davidson, 59 Iowa 461, 13
N.W. 442 (1882); Watson v. Nelson, 69 N.Y. 536 (1877); Noyes v. Byxbee,
45 Conn. 382 (1877)-; Ex parte Malinkrodt, 20 Mo. 493 (1847). A suggestion
that the power to subpoena witnesses and books and papers confers by implication the power to commit for contempt is found in Ex parte Sanford, 236
Mo. 665, 139 S.W. 376 (1911). McQuillin unequivocally states that the power
of municipal legislative bodies to punish for contempt must be granted expressly and cannot be implied or inferred, 4 McQuiLLiN, MuNicipAL CoaroRATIONS, §13.52 (3d ed. 1949).
05 Haas v. Jennings, 120 Ohio St. 370, 166 N.E. 357 (1929) ; State ex rel. Peers
v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915) ; People ex rel. Webster v.
Van Tassel, 64 Hun. 444, 17 N.Y.S. 933, aff'd, 19 N.Y.S. 643 (3d Dept. 1892);
In re Dunn, 9 Mo. App. 255 (1880).
106 ILL. REv. STAT., c. 24, §23-111 (1953).
107 OHIo REV. CODE ANN., tit. 7, §705.21 (1954).
108 GEN. LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND, c. 537, §4 (1938).
109 One finds a similar provision in the early acts in New York State, note 20
supra.
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ment for contempt is indicated, it may vary from a general statement
of whatever a court would be empowered to do if the matter were
pending there,110 to a fine,11 imprisonment,"12 or both."13
Under certain other circumstances the courts have denied to city
councils the power to punish for contempt. When a witness was held
in contempt for refusing to take an oath and committed to jail, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the mittimus issued was
114
illegal because no definite term of punishment was specified in it.

A commitment for refusing to produce books and accounts was also
set aside in New York State on the grounds that the charter authorized
commitment only for refusing to attend, to be sworn, or to answer
questions, and not for refusing to produce books and papers." 5 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held a statute conferring
power to imprison and punish for contempt unconstitutional because
a city council making an investigation was neither a legislature nor
a court and could not be vested with authority to punish without right
6
of appeal or trial by jury."1

The power of investigation would appear to be an essential part of
the legislative process at all levels of government, including the local.
The desirability of having facts on which to base public policy is
obvious. At all levels of government, including the local, there is
danger of abuse of this policy. A survey of the case law indicates
that while the power has in most cases been properly used by city
councils, in some instances there have been abuses of the power. The
courts, by checking the abuse of such power, have served as guardians
of the rights of the individual. The greatest protection in the future,
as it has been in the past, is the election of city council members who
are interested in the furtherance of the general welfare by the determination of wise public policy.
110 Notes 10 and 20 supra.
111 State ex rel. Holloway v. Rhodes, 33 O.L.A. 26, 35 N.E.2d 987 (1940). The
fine of witnesses for non-attendance after being subpoenaed is specified as not
to exceed $20.
112 Haas v. Jennings, 120 Ohio St. 370, 166 N.E. 357 (1929); Ex parte Holman,
197 Mo. App. 70, 191 S.W. 1109, aff'd, 270 Mo. 696, 195 S.W. 711 (1917);
People ex rel. Webster v. Van Tassel, 64 Hun. 444, 17 N.Y.S. 938, aff'd, 19
N.Y.S. 643 (3d Dept. 1892); In re Dunn, 9 Mo. App. 255 (1880). Cf.
Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489- (1931) ; Ex parte Sanford, 236
Mo. 665, 139 S.W. 376 (1911).
An
"3 State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915).
interesting provision in LA. REv. STAT., tit. 38, c. 10, §2182 (1950), makes
persons or corporations refusing to testify or produce books and papers in
investigations concerning .state contracts ineligible to hold contracts with the
state.
114 In re Hammel, 9 R.I. 248 (1869). Cf. Haas v. Jennings, 120 Ohio St. 370,
166 N.E. 357 (1929).
"'sPeople ex rel. Webster v. Van Tassel, 64 Hun. 444, 17 N.Y.S. 938, aff'd, 19
N.Y.S. 643 (3d Dept. 1892).
116 In re Whitcomb, 120 Mass. 118 (1876).

